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Case Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS - RIGHT To
REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a surrogate decision maker may exercise the
right of an adult patient in a persistent vegetative state to with-
draw life-sustaining medical treatment via substituted
judgment.
In Re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996)
In 1972, as a result of a severe motorcycle accident, Daniel
Joseph Fiori ("Fiori") suffered severe head injuries and was ren-
dered comatose.' At the time, Fiori was approximately twenty
years of age.2 Although Fiori eventually regained consciousness,
he was confined to a wheelchair and his cognitive abilities were
severely limited.3 Fiori suffered a second head injury in 1976,
and from this injury he never regained consciousness. 4 He was
subsequently diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state5
1. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. 1996). The accident occurred while Fiori was
enlisted in the Navy. In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), aft'd, 673
A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996).
2. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908.
3. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1360 (Wieand, J., concurring). Fiori could only communicate
through facial expressions, bodily gestures and limited verbal sounds. Id. After the acci-
dent, Fiori lived at home with his mother, Rosemarie Sherman, until 1976. Brief of
Appellee at 3, Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No.000737).
4. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908. Fiori suffered his second head injury while being
treated in a veterans administration hospital for a fractured leg. Brief of Appellee at 3,
Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No.000737).
5. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908. A "vegetative state" is a condition in which the body
functions only in terms of internal controls, i.e., maintains temperature, heart beat, pul-
monary ventilation, digestive activity and reflex activity of nerves and muscles. An indi-
vidual in a vegetative state exhibits no behavioral evidence of self-awareness or
awareness of surroundings. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 267 n.1 (1990) (citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987))). "Persistent" vege-
tative state refers to a wakeful unconscious state that lasts longer than a few weeks. Id.
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and kept alive by nutrition and medications provided to him
through a gastrostomy tube.6
In 1980, Fiori's mother, Rosemarie Sherman, was appointed
guardian of his person by court order.7 In 1992, Ms. Sherman
filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
requesting an authorization for the removal of Fiori's gastros-
tomy tube.8 Ms. Sherman alleged within the petition that such
action would be in accord with Fiori's wishes.9 At a hearing on
the petition, both a court-appointed independent medical expert
and a neurologist retained by Ms. Sherman testified within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Fiori's condition
would not improve.10 Subsequently, on October 23, 1992, the
court of common pleas entered an order authorizing the Mayo
at n.1 (citing Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegeta-
tive State (Pts. 1 & 2), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1501 (1994)).
6. Id. at 908. A "gastrostomy tube" is a tube that is "surgically inserted in the
stomach." Id. "Gastrostomy" refers to the creation of an opening into the stomach for the
purpose of providing food and liquids when swallowing is impossible. MILLER-KEANE
ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DIcTIoNARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH 601 (5th ed.
1992).
7. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 908. On January 7, 1980, the court of common pleas issued
an order declaring Rosemarie Sherman to be guardian of her son's person. In re Fiori, 17
Pa. D.&C.4th 558, 559 (1993).
8. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909. In February of 1992, Ms. Sherman requested the Mayo
Nursing Center to terminate Fiori's life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 908. The
nursing home refused to comply without a court order. Id. at 908-09. Ms. Sherman sub-
sequently filed a petition in the court of common pleas, requesting an order directing the
nursing home to terminate her son's life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 909.
9. Id. In her petition, Ms. Sherman contended that Fiori had no meaningful
existence and therefore the life support served no purpose. Fiori, 17 Pa. D.&C.4th at 559.
Ms. Sherman testified that Fiori never expressed an opinion regarding life-sustaining
treatment; however, based on his "love of life," she was of the opinion that he would want
the gastrostomy tube to be removed. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909.
10. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909. Dr. William Stover Wiggins, Fiori's treating neurolo-
gist, and Dr. David G. Cook, the court appointed neurologist, testified concerning Fiori's
condition. Fiori, 17 Pa. D.&C.4th at 558. Dr. Wiggins diagnosed Fiori as being in a per-
sistent vegetative state, and testified that an electroencephalogram ("EEG") performed on
Fiori revealed "no areas of normal brain activity" and a magnetic resonance image
("MR l") revealed "profound abnormalities of both cerebral hemispheres." Brief of Appel-
lee at 2, Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No.000737). An EEG is a recording of changes in
electric potentials in the brain. MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICIONARY OF
MEDICINE, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH 474 (5th ed. 1992). An MRI is a procedure for
imaging tissues of high fat and water content that cannot be seen with other radiologic
techniques. Id. at 877. Dr. Cook confirmed the persistent vegetative state diagnosis and
testified that the MRI revealed "severe ventricular enlargement" and "cerebral atrophy"
with "only a ribbon of residual cortical tissue remaining." Brief of Appellee at 2, Fiori,
673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No.000737).
Prior to his incompetency, Fiori never executed a written document expressing
his wishes with respect to the provision or termination of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. Appellee's Brief at 4, Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (No.000737).
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Nursing Center to discontinue Fiori's life-sustaining medical
treatment."1
In November of 1992, the court of common pleas modified its
previous order as a decree nisi 2 and the Pennsylvania Attorney
General intervened in Fiori's case on behalf of the Common-
wealth.13 The issue before the court then was whether Ms. Sher-
man's request for court authorization to discontinue Fiori's life-
sustaining treatment was in Fiori's best interests and consistent
with his wishes."
In analyzing the state's interest in preserving Fiori's life, the
court noted that the state's interest in preserving life grows
weaker, and a patient's interest in terminating life-sustaining
treatment grows stronger, as the patient's prognosis dims and
the patient's treatment becomes more intrusive.' 5 The court
then looked to previous cases that allowed a surrogate decision
maker to exercise substituted judgment 6 when determining
whether to terminate the life-sustaining medical treatment of an
11. Fiori, 17 Pa.D.&C.4th at 558-59.
12. A decree nisi is a provisional decree that is made absolute on motion unless
cause against it can be shown. BLACS LAw DICToNARY 411 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Fiori, 17 Pa.D.&C.4th at 559. The Attorney General intervened on the basis
that the petitioner failed to notify the District Attorney, and the court failed to appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent Fiori. Id. A "guardian ad litem" is a special guardian
appointed by the court to represent an infant, ward or unborn person in litigation.
BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 706 (6th ed. 1990). The common pleas court deemed the Attor-
ney General's objections waived because he did not make either objection at the time of
the hearing. Fiori, 17 Pa.D.&C.4th at 559. The court then noted that neither Fiori nor
the Commonwealth suffered a lack of representation at the hearing as both were well
represented by the Attorney General. Id.
14. Fiori, 17 Pa.D.&C.4th at 560. Ms. Sherman contended that the court should
follow the decisions of other jurisdictions that recognize the right to terminate a patient's
life-sustaining treatment when the termination is not in conflict with the state's interests
in preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties and preserving
the integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 560-61 (citing Ragona v. Preate, 6 Pa.
D.&C.4th 202 (1990Xholding that right of sixty-four year old patient in persistent vegeta-
tive state to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment did not undermine state's inter-
est in preserving life)).
15. Id. at 561 (citing Ragona, 6 Pa.D.&C.4th at 202.) The court noted that state
interests in preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties and preserving the
integrity of the medical profession were not applicable in this case because there was no
interest in suicide, no third parties involved and the medical profession supports the ter-
mination of life-sustaining treatment. Id.
16. The doctrine of substituted judgment allows a substitute decisionmaker to
render a decision on behalf of an incompetent individual that conforms, as accurately as
possible, to the decision that the incompetent individual would make if he or she was
able. Fiori, 17 Pa.D.&C.4th at 563. The "substituted judgment" standard focuses on
determining whether the incompetent patient would choose to continue or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment based on the patient's personal value system rather than the
patient's prior clear expressions. Brief of Appellee at Exhibit B, Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa.
1996) (No.000737).
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incompetent individual. 17 Relying on this case law, the court
asserted that a patient, while competent, need not express an
intent to maintain or withdraw his or her own life-sustaining
medical treatment in the event of later incompetence to make
such a decision since a surrogate may make such a conclusion
based upon information obtained from a family relationship."8
The court then found that the decision whether to withdraw an
individual's life-sustaining medical treatment, in situations
where the individual is incompetent and has not previously
expressed an opinion on the matter, must be made only with ref-
erence to the individual's best interests19 in light of objective soci-
etally shared criteria.20 This "best interests" standard employed
by the court requires the substitute decision maker to consider
the following factors when making the withdrawal decision: (1)
the relief from suffering; (2) the preservation or restoration of
functioning; and (3) the quality and extent of the life being
preserved.2'
The court concluded that in this case, Ms. Sherman's decision
to seek termination of Fiori's life-sustaining medical treatment
was made in consideration of the above criteria.22 Therefore, the
court reaffimed its previous order authorizing the withdrawal of
Fiori's abdominal feeding tube.23
17. Fiori, 17 Pa.D.&C.4th at 563. The court cited as authority In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)(holding guardian and family of incompetent individual authorized to
determine whether she would exercise right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment), and
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977)(holding that substituted judgment standard requires decision regarding removal of
life-sustaining treatment to be subjectively based on wants and needs of incompetent
individual rather than on what society considers prudent). Id.
18. Id. The surrogate's decision concerning the removal of life-sustaining treat-
ment should be consistent with the decision that would be made by the incompetent indi-
vidual. Id. (citing Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431).
19. The "best interests" standard focuses on the patient's best interests considering
the value of the patient's continued life. Brief of Appellee at Exhibit B, Fiori, 673 A.2d
905 (Pa. 1996) (No.000737).
20. Fiori, Pa.D.&C.4th at 564 (citing Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 482
A.2d 713 (Conn. 1984)(holding that family of forty-two year old woman suffering from
multiple sclerosis may act as substitute decisionmaker with respect to her right to termi-
nate life-sustaining treatment)). The court applied an objective "best interests" standard,
under which the decisionmaker may determine whether terminating life-sustaining med-
ical treatment would be in the best interests of the patient in a persistent vegetative
state. Id. at 565 (citing Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, Ethical, Medical,
and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions, President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Biobehavioral Research, 134-35 (1983)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 565.
23. Id. The court concluded that Fiori's irreversible condition rendered his life
without content or quality. Id. The court subsequently issued the order authorizing the
termination of Fiori's life-sustaining medical treatment on February 3, 1993. Id.
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The Attorney General appealed the case to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, contending that the court of common pleas erred
in authorizing the termination of Fiori's life-sustaining treat-
ment without first requiring clear and convincing evidence that
Fiori would want the treatment terminated.24 The Attorney
General also argued that determining whether the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard is met should be decided in a court
proceeding.25 Finally, the Attorney General asserted that the
court of common pleas erred by not appointing a guardian ad
litem26 to represent Fiori.
27
The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that an individual has
a right to self-determine whether to accept or reject life-sus-
taining medical treatment based on a federal due process liberty
interest, the state constitutional right to privacy and the com-
mon law right to control and refuse medical treatment.2s The
superior court added, however, that this right to self-determina-
24. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1352. The Attorney General contended that a prior express
statement by the patient is the only evidence that would satisfy the clear and convincing
evidence standard. Id. The superior court asserted that the Attorney General's position
was not supported by the Advance Directive for Health Care Act or the recent amend-
ments to Pennsylvania's guardianship statute. Id. at 1359. See Advance Directive for
Health Care Act, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5402(b)(1992); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5502 (1992).
The Advance Directive for Health Care Act establishes standards by which competent
individuals may execute advance directives. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5402(b)(1992).
According to the court, the Act does not create any presumptions regarding the intent of
an individual who has not executed a declaration concerning the use or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, and does not impair or supersede an individual's existing rights.
Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1359.
The court further noted that the guardianship statute's requirement that "clear
and convincing" evidence of incapacity be established before a guardian may be appointed
to an incapacitated individual has no bearing on the burden of proof required for the
discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 1360. Specifically, the guardianship
statute does not support the Attorney General's position that "clear and convincing" evi-
dence of the incompetent individual's intent to accept or reject life-sustaining medical
treatment be presented before the termination of a patient's life-sustaining medical treat-
ment may be authorized. Id.
A divided panel of the superior court initially reversed the decision of the court of
common pleas on November 16, 1993. Id. The panel opinion was then withdrawn after
both sides moved for reargument en banc. Id. En banc refers to a session where the
entire membership of the court will participate in the decision rather than the regular
quorum. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Fori, 652 A.2d at 1352.
26. A "guardian ad litem" is a special guardian appointed by the court to represent
an infant, ward or unborn person in litigation. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed.
1990).
27. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1352. The court quickly disposed of this issue, holding that
there was no need to appoint a guardian ad litem for Fiori because no legal proceeding
was necessary. Id.
28. Id. at 1353. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. AMEND.
XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is a federal due
process liberty interest in the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. See Cruzan v.
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tion is limited by the state's countervailing interests.29 Accord-
ing to the court, the state interest applicable in the instant
matter was Pennsylvania's interest in preserving life.3 0  The
court next asserted that a state's interest in preserving life is
generally outweighed by a competent individual's right to self-
determine whether to accept or reject medical treatment, even at
the risk of his or her own death.31
The court noted, however, that a more difficult question arises
when considering an incompetent individual's right to terminate
medical treatment, because he or she is unable to directly exer-
cise the right.3 2 The court reasoned that the only way to effectu-
ate an incompetent individual's right to self-determine whether
to accept or reject medical treatment is to allow a surrogate deci-
sion maker to exercise substituted judgment on the individual's
behalf.3 The court then found that judicial involvement is not
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990Xholding that competent person
has constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
The right of privacy is embodied in Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1354. Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion provides: "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their
own happiness." PA. CONST. ART. I, § 1.
Article I, Section 8 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the
afflant.
PA. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
Pennsylvania common law provides that absent an emergency, medical treat-
ment may not be given to a patient without the patient's informed consent. Fiori, 652
A.2d at 1354 (citing Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003 (Pa. 1992)(holding that absent
emergency, physician commits assault when operating on patient without patient's
consent).
29. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1354. The court noted that protecting third parties, prevent-
ing suicide, protecting the ethical integrity of the medical community and preserving life
are the four countervailing state interests. Id.
30. Id. The court found that the state interest in preventing suicide was not appli-
cable to this case because Fiori was not capable of taking his own life. Id. State interest
in protecting third parties also did not apply because there were no third parties in need
of protection. Id. Finally, the integrity of the medical profession was not in question in
Fiori because the Pennsylvania Medical Society found that terminating Fiori's life-sus-
taining medical treatment presented no medical ethical problems. Id.
31. Id. at 1355 (citing Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985)).
32. Id. (citing Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1227).
33. Id. at 1357. The superior court asserted that the substituted judgment should
be based on the incompetent individual's prior expressions, personality, philosophy and
value system. Id.
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needed in this process when there is no dispute as to the substi-
tuted decision.'
The life-sustaining medical treatment of a person in a persis-
tent vegetative state may also be terminated without court
involvement, according to the court, when the consent of a "close
family member" and two qualified physicians is obtained.35 In
conclusion, therefore, the superior court agreed with the decision
of the court of common pleas and declared that the life-sus-
taining treatment being provided to Fiori should be terminated. 6
The Attorney General timely sought allocatur of the superior
court's decision, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted. The issue before the court on appeal was whether the
life-sustaining medical treatment of an adult patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state, who has left no advance directive, may be
discontinued absent court involvement when consent of the
patient's close relative and two physicians is obtained.38
In beginning its analysis, the supreme court found that the
right to refuse medical treatment is profoundly entrenched in
34. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1358. The court rejected the view that court intervention is
necessary to protect the patient, noting that such a view weakens the traditional and
vital respect for the family and perpetuates the unhealthy idea that courts are the only
body in our society able to perform the function of protecting the patient. Id. The court
also noted that the Commonwealth's traditional respect for family privacy and self-gov-
ernance includes the right of a patient's close relative to decide whether the patient would
wish to live in a vegetative state. Id.
35. Id. at 1351. The court held that the surrogate decision maker must obtain
written statements from two qualified physicians certifying that the patient is in a persis-
tent vegetative condition and has no hope of recovery. Id. at 1358. If the patient has an
attending physician, the attending physician must also submit such a statement. Id.
The court determined that close family members usually consist of, but are not limited to,
the spouse, parent, adult child or sibling of the patient. Id.
36. Id. at 1360.
37. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909. The Attorney General contended that life-sustaining
medical treatment may not be removed from an individual in a persistent vegetative state
without court approval and the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id. at 911. The
Attorney General also argued that life-sustaining treatment may not be removed from an
individual in a persistent vegetative state without clear and convincing evidence of the
individual's intent to terminate the treatment. Id. at 913.
Fiori died of pneumonia before the supreme court granted the appeal of his case.
Id. The supreme court granted the appeal notwithstanding Fiori's death because the case
raised an issue of important public interest that was likely to re-occur and avoid review.
Id. at 909 n.4.
38. Id. at 908. The supreme court found that although the Advance Directive for
Health Care Act provided for fulfillment of a patient's wishes where the patient created
advance directives prior to incapacitation, the Act did not address the situation arising
when the patient fails to create a document. Id. at 910. Consistent with the superior
court's determination, the supreme court then asserted that persistent vegetative state
patients are not prevented from exercising their right to self-determination merely
because the Act failed to address their situation. Id. at 911 n.7.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 35:917
common law.3 9 Additionally, the court asserted that an individ-
ual's right to self-determine whether to accept or reject life-sus-
taining medical treatment does not cease upon incapacitation,
and must only be balanced against countervailing state
interests. 4°
The supreme court found that Pennsylvania's only interest in
the Fiori case was to preserve life.4 ' The court then concluded
that this interest did not outweigh the right of Fiori to refuse
medical treatment.42
Having thus established a patient's right to terminate support,
the supreme court next determined that the clear and convincing
evidence standard followed by a minority of states is overly
restrictive because it frustrates a patient's right of self-determi-
nation. 43 The supreme court found that the substituted judg-
ment standard is the correct way to effectuate a patient's right to
self-determine whether to accept or reject life-sustaining medical
treatment.44 Specifically, the court found that a close family
member is the appropriate party to determine whether the
39. Id. at 909. The supreme court noted that no right is afforded more protection
by the common law than the right to be free from bodily invasion. Id. (citing Union
Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). The court further noted that
the doctrine of informed consent, which holds that medical treatment may not be pro-
vided to a patient in a non-emergency situation without the patient's informed consent, is
derived from the right to be free from bodily invasion. Id. at 910 (citing Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). The court then held that
since the right to refuse and withdraw consent to medical treatment is a logical corollary
to the doctrine of informed consent, it is entitled to common law protection. Id. (citing
Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1992)).
40. Id. at 910. The supreme court acknowledged that sister states' courts have
unanimously concluded that a patient's right to self-determination does not cease upon
incapacity. Id. (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (holding that right to terminate medical treatment is not lost upon incompetence);
In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983)(holding that terminally ill adult in vegetative
state has right to terminate medical treatment)). The court listed the countervailing
state interests to be the protection of third parties, the prevention of suicide, the protec-
tion of the ethical integrity of the medical community and the preservation of life. Id.
41. Id.
42. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910. In accordance with the superior court's analysis, the
supreme court asserted that the state's interest in protecting third parties centers on
whether the patient has dependents who would be financially and emotionally distressed
if the patient refused medical treatment. Id. Thus, the court held that third party inter-
ests were not a concern in the present case as Fiori had no dependents. Id. The court
also noted that the state's interest in preventing suicide was not applicable to Fiori
because the removal of life-sustaining treatment allows the patient to die from natural
causes rather than self-inflicted injury. Id.
43. Id. at 911. The supreme court asserted that the "clear and convincing evi-
dence" standard requires the patient to have explicitly stated his or her wishes prior to
incapacitation. Id. at 911 n.9.
44. Id. The court explained that the substituted judgment approach requires a
surrogate decision maker to consider a patient's personal value system, prior statements
and personality for guidance. Id. at 911. In addition, the substituted judgment approach
924
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incompetent patient would want to terminate life-sustaining
medical treatment.4"
The court also held, however, that prior to deciding whether to
terminate the patient's life-sustaining medical treatment, the
surrogate decision maker must obtain written statements from
two doctors qualified to evaluate the patient's condition. 46 These
doctors must certify that the patient is in a permanent vegetative
state.47 The court then stated that where "interested parties"4
are in agreement concerning the decision to terminate life sup-
port, courts should not become involved.49
The issue presented by the Fiori case had never previously
been before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Several jurisdic-
tions, however, have grappled with the decision of life support
termination for decades. The New Jersey Supreme Court
appears to have been the first court in the nation to consider
whether a person in a long term persistent vegetative state may
terminate his or her life-sustaining medical treatment via the
substituted judgment of his or her family.50 In the case of In re
is aimed at effectuating the decision that the incapacitated individual would have made if
he or she were competent. Id.
The court noted that the "best interests" standard would be inappropriate where
the patient's wishes can be discerned and implemented via substituted judgment. Id. at
912 n.11. The court then held that the decision maker must employ a substituted judg-
ment where there is enough information to ascertain what the patient would have
desired. Id. The court did not determine whether the best interests standard may be
employed in situations where the patient's wishes cannot be discerned. Id.
45. Id. at 912. The court asserted that close family members are usually the people
with most knowledge about the patient's preferences, goals and values. Id.
46. Id. Additionally, if the patient has an attending physician, this physician
should also submit a statement regarding the patient's condition. Id. at 913.
47. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 912-13. A "permanent" vegetative state refers to an irrevers-
ible condition. Id. at 908 n.1. A "persistent" vegetative state resulting from a traumatic
injury can be judged "permanent" twelve months after the occurrence of the injury. Id.
The supreme court noted that the diagnosis of Fiori's condition predated the distinction
between "permanent" and "persistent" vegetative states. Id. Since Fiori had spent
approximately nineteen years in a vegetative state prior to his death, however, the court
noted that he would have been diagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state under
current standards. Id.
48. According to the court, "interested parties" include close family members, the
guardian of the incompetent, attending physicians and the care facility in which the
patient is located. Id. at 913 n.13.
49. Id. at 913. The court noted that the judiciary's role should be limited to resolv-
ing disputes. Id.
50. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). On
April 15, 1975, for unexplained reasons, Karen Anne Quinlan stopped breathing for at
least fifteen minutes on two separate occasions. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653-54. Ms. Quin-
lan was subsequently transported by ambulance to the Hospital. Id. at 654. Three days
later, Dr. Robert J. Morse, neurologist and treating physician, examined Ms. Quinlan and
found her to be in a comatose state, requiring a respirator to assist her in breathing. Id.
Dr. Morse concluded that Ms. Quinlan's condition was the result of anoxia, which is a lack
of oxygen in the bloodstream. Id. Dr. Morse then described Ms. Quinlan as being in a
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Quinlan," the father of Karen Anne Quinlan sought guardian-
ship of her person and the express power to authorize the discon-
tinuance of all extraordinary life-sustaining treatments.52 The
court in Quinlan found that an individual's decision to terminate
his or her medical treatment is encompassed within the right of
privacy guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 53  The
court then noted that when an individual is incompetent to make
that decision on his or her own behalf, the parens patriae
54
responsibility of the state to protect disabled individuals permits
judges to implement and authorize medical decisions via substi-
tuted judgment.5"
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the only practical
way to protect the patient's right to terminate medical treatment
in Quinlan was to permit the patient's guardian and family, in
consultation with her attending physicians and an ethics com-
mittee, to exercise their best judgment as to whether the patient
would terminate her treatment under the circumstances.56 The
court concluded that requiring judicial confirmation of the guard-
ian and physicians' decision would be inappropriate.57
In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,58 the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court analyzed a similar case that considered
the provision, rather than withdrawal, of life-sustaining treat-
ment.59 The court addressed the issue of whether a terminally
persistent vegetative state. Id. Dr. Fred Plum, creator of the term "persistent vegetative
state," defined Ms. Quinlan as having no cognitive function. Id.
51. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
52. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653.
53. Id. at 663. The court recognized that a right to personal privacy emanates from
a penumbra of specific guarantees contained within the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(holding that specific guarantees in Bill of Rights create
penumbra of rights from which the right to privacy emanates). The court noted that the
right of privacy encompasses the right of an individual to decline medical treatment in
much the same way as it encompasses the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy.
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.
54. Parens patriae refers to the role of a state to protect as guardian those under a
legal disability. BLAcK's LAw DxcrIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
55. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 666. See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972)(hold-
ing that doctrine of substituted judgment permits court of equity to act for incompetent
person and is broad enough to include all matters concerning well-being of legally inca-
pacitated person); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W. 2d 145 (Ky. 1969)(holding that parens
patriae responsibility, which permits courts to interfere in situations where individuals
are incapable of protecting themselves, is recognized as doctrine of substituted judgment
and is broad enough to cover all matters concerning well-being of incompetent ward).
56. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664. According to the court, a majority of members of
society would exercise the right to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment in the
same way if they, or those closest to them, were in similar circumstances. Id.
57. Id. at 669. The court declared that judicial confirmation would be cumbersome
and constitute an encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence. Id.
58. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
59. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
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ill, mentally incompetent patient committed to a state institution
should be provided with potentially life-prolonging medical treat-
ment.6 ° Specifically, the court considered whether chemotherapy
treatments should be given to Joseph Saikewicz, a sixty-seven
year old incompetent individual suffering from acute myeloblas-
tic monocytic leukemia, a form of cancer.6'
The Saikewicz court noted that the law of Massachusetts
implicitly recognizes an individual's strong interest in prevent-
ing a nonconsensual invasion of his or her bodily integrity.
6 2
Similar to the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
Quinlan case, the Saikewicz court recognized that the constitu-
tional right to privacy grounded in the penumbra of specific guar-
antees within the Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution is
broad enough to protect an individual's interest in avoiding
unwanted infringement of bodily integrity.63 According to the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, an individual's right to
refuse to consent to life-prolonging medical treatment must be
balanced against the interests of the state.64
The court found that there is a substantial distinction between
a state's interest in preserving the life of an individual suffering
from a curable affliction and an individual suffering from an
incurable illness.6 When an individual is suffering from an
affliction that will soon end his or her life, the state's interest in
prolonging the individual's life is less, and must be balanced
against the individual's interest in rejecting the burdens of such
prolongation.6
Turning to the issue of how an incompetent individual exer-
cises his or her right to accept or refuse medical treatment, the
Massachusetts court found that such a patient's right should be
exercised through a substituted judgment conforming as nearly
as possible to the decision that the incompetent individual would
60. Id.
61. Id. at 420. Mr. Saikewicz was profoundly retarded with an I.Q. of ten and a
mental age of approximately two years and eight months. Id. He was unable to commu-
nicate verbally and responded only to gestures or contact. Id.
62. Id. at 424.
63. Id. The court noted that where an incompetent individual is unable to assert
his or her right to privacy against unwanted infringement of bodily integrity, a guardian
may assert such right on the individual's behalf. Id.
64. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427. The court listed the state's interests to be the
preservation of life, protection of innocent third parties, prevention of suicide and the
ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 425.
65. Id. at 425-26. The court recognized that the right to decline medical treatment
is not inconsistent with the state's interests when the individual is suffering from an
incurable illness. Id. at 426.
66. Id. at 425.
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make. 7 Contrary to the Quinlan court, however, the Saikewicz
court held that the ultimate decision making responsibility
should remain with the judiciary.68
In Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital,69 the Connecticut
Supreme Court effectuated an incompetent individual's right to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment through the use of the "best
interests" standard, rather than through the use of the "substi-
tuted judgment" standard employed by the Quinlan and
Saikewicz courts. 70  The Foody court addressed the issue of
whether a court could discontinue the life-sustaining medical
treatment of a forty-two year old patient suffering from multiple
sclerosis.71 Ms. Foody had been diagnosed as suffering from mul-
tiple sclerosis for approximately twenty-four years. 72 On Decem-
ber 15, 1983, she suffered a respiratory arrest due to
asphyxiation 73 while eating, which resulted in severe
hypothermia74 and left her in a semicomatose state.75
In resolving the issue of whether Ms. Foody's life-sustaining
treatment should be discontinued, the Connecticut Supreme
Court first noted that common law has long recognized the pro-
tection from unwanted medical treatment afforded by the consti-
tutional right to privacy and an individual's right to self-
determine whether to accept or reject life-sustaining medical
treatment.76 The court then found that the decision to withdraw
67. Id. at 431. The court asserted that both the guardian ad litem and judge
should attempt to ascertain the incompetent individual's actual interests and prefer-
ences. Id.
68. Id. at 434-35. The court acknowledged that questions of life and death require
a detached but passionate investigation, and whether to remove life-sustaining treatment
is a decision that can be most properly accomplished by the judiciary. Id. at 435.
69. 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1984).
70. Foody, 482 A.2d at 721.
71. Id. at 715-16.
72. Id. at 716.
73. "Asphyxiation" refers to suffocating or depriving of oxygen. MILLER-KEANE
ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NuRsING, AND ALLIED HEALTH 142 (5th ed.
1992).
74. "Hypothermia" means low body temperature. Id. at 736-37.
75. Foody, 482 A.2d at 715-16. Ms. Foody was subsequently placed on a respirator
and a nasogastric tube was inserted into her stomach to provide her with nutrition. Id. at
716. Medical testimony indicated that Ms. Foody had no pain response, and, in all medi-
cal probability, no cognitive function. Id. The court subsequently determined that Ms.
Foody's condition was permanent and that she would require long term care in a chronic
care facility for the rest of her life. Id. at 717.
76. Id. at 717. The court noted that the constitutional right to privacy includes the
right to be free from governmental intrusion into matters affecting fundamental rights.
Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). The court also asserted that no
common law right is afforded more protection than the right of an individual to totally
possess and control his or her own body. Id. (quoting Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Bot-
sford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). Additionally, the court noted that this right includes the
right of a competent adult to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 718 (quoting
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a patient's life-sustaining medical treatment in situations where
the patient is incompetent and has not expressed an opinion on
the matter must be made with regard to the individual's best
interests in light of objective societally shared criteria.77 Such
best interests are met, according to the court, when the incompe-
tent patient's doctor and two consulting physicians concur as to
the patient's irreversible condition and concerned family mem-
bers act as the patient's substitute decision maker.78 In this
case, the court found that Ms. Foody's family could decide to dis-
continue her life-sustaining treatment via a substitute decision
on her behalf.
79
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of In the Matter of
Nancy Ellen Jobes8 ° revisited the question of whether withdraw-
ing life-sustaining medical treatment from a patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state is proper when there is no clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's attitude toward such treat-
ment."' In Jobes, Mrs. Jobes suffered a severe loss of oxygen and
blood flow to her brain, which resulted in irreversible damage to
the part of her brain controlling thought and movement.8 2 Mrs.
Jobes was then provided with life-sustaining nourishment via a
tube surgically inserted into her small intestine.8 3
The court in Jobes noted that a patient's right to self-determi-
nation is the predominant factor in deciding whether to continue
or withdraw his or her life-sustaining medical treatment, and the
Matter of Fox, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 203 (1979)). Further, when an individual is incompe-
tent, courts have permitted guardians to exercise the right to refuse medical treatment on
his or her behalf. Id.
77. Id. at 721. The incompetent patient need not have previously expressed an
intent to maintain or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, as the treatment with-
drawal decision may be based upon information regarding the patient obtained from a
family member. Id. (citing Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977)). In considering the individual's best interest, the court noted that the decision
maker must consider factors such as the patient's relief from suffering, the preservation
or restoration of functioning and the quality and extent of the patient's life. Id. (quoting
Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in
Treatment Decisions, President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Biobehavioral Research, at 135 (1983)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 721-22.
80. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
81. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 436.
82. Id. at 436. Dr. Fred Plum, professor and Chairman of the Department of Neu-
rology at Cornell University, and Dr. David E. Levy, associate professor of neurology at
Cornell University, concluded that Mrs. Jobes was in a persistent vegetative state with
no chance for recovery. Id. at 438-39. Mrs. Jobes' family, closest friends and clergyman
testified that Mrs. Jobes would refuse this life-sustaining treatment if she was competent.
Id. at 442.
83. Id. at 437.
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judiciary should not make the termination decision.8 4 As to ter-
minating the life-sustaining medical treatment of an incompe-
tent patient, the court found that the patient's family members
are the appropriate parties to render and thus "substitute" the
patient's decision regarding whether to withdraw the treat-
ment. 5 Similar to the court's opinion in Quinlan, the Jobes
court concluded that absent a dispute among the patient's family
members, guardian and physicians as to the withdrawal deci-
sion, judicial review of the substituted decision is unnecessary.8 6
In the case of In re Westchester County Medical Center on
Behalf of O'Connor,7 the New York Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether an incompetent individual should be denied
life-sustaining medical care absent clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's intent to refuse such treatment.8 8 Specifically,
the court considered whether to permit a hospital to insert a
feeding tube into an incompetent patient despite the objection of
the patient's family.89 In O'Connor, Mary O'Connor was ren-
dered incompetent at approximately seventy-seven years of age
as a result of several strokes.90 The Westchester County Medical
Center subsequently sought court authorization to provide nour-
ishment to Ms. O'Connor through the use of a nasogastric feed-
ing tube.91 Ms. O'Connor's daughters objected to the use of a
nasogastric tube, stating that such action would be contrary to
their mother's expressed wishes.92
In deciding the issue, the New York Supreme Court first recog-
nized that individuals have a common law right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.93 Contrary to the cases previously
discussed, however, the court noted that with respect to an
84. Id. According to the court, the proper role of the judiciary is to establish crite-
ria that respects the right to self-determination and protects incompetent patients. Id.
85. Id. at 445 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)). The court asserted that
the patient's family members generally understand the patient's medical attitude and are
the best qualified to render a substituted judgment because of their special bond with the
patient. Id.
86. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 451.
87. 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
88. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 608.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 607.
91. Id. at 609. The hospital claimed that absent such relief, Ms. O'Connor would
die of thirst and starvation within a few weeks. Id.
92. Id. at 608. One daughter testified that Ms. O'Connor had advised her on sev-
eral occasions that if she became fll and was unable to care for herself, she would not wish
to live via artificial life support. Id. at 611 n.10.
93. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 611. According to the court, the common law of New
York recognizes the right of a competent individual to refuse life-saving treatment in the
absence of an overriding state interest. Id. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital,
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)(holding that every adult of sound mind has right to determine
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incompetent individual, effectuating this right through the use of
a substituted judgment standard is improper.94 According to the
court, only the patient's expressed intent regarding the treat-
ment decision may be considered. 95 Consequently, the court held
that an incompetent individual should not be denied medical
care unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the indi-
vidual's express intent to refuse treatment.96
In Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming,97 the Arizona Supreme
Court considered whether a guardian could exercise the right of
an incompetent nursing home patient to refuse medical treat-
ment by consenting to the removal of the patient's nasogastric
tube and the placement of "do not resuscitate" and "do not hospi-
talize" notations on the patient's medical chart.98 In Rasmussen,
Mildred Rasmussen was admitted to the Posada Del Sol Nursing
home at the age of sixty-four.9 9 Following deterioration of her
physical and mental condition, Ms. Rasmussen was provided
with nourishment and fluids through a nasogastric tube. 00 She
later suffered three strokes, and acquired a degenerative neural
muscular disease and organic brain syndrome. 1 1
In addressing the issue of whether Ms. Rasmussen's guardian
could consent to the removal of her nasogastric tube, the Arizona
Supreme Court determined that Ms. Rasmussen had a common
law right, state constitutional right and fundamental constitu-
what shall be done with his or her own body and that physician commits assault when
performing an operation on patient without patient's consent).
94. Id. at 613. The court noted that the substituted judgment standard conflicts
with a state's fundamental commitment to the idea that an individual or court should not
be permitted to substitute its judgment for an individual's as to whether the individual's
quality of life is acceptable to him or her. Id. at 613.
95. Id. The court asserted that, despite inevitable pitfalls and uncertainties, a rig-
orous burden of proof is required to ensure that if an error occurs, the error results in life
rather than death.
96. Id. The court held that clear and convincing evidence of Ms. O'Connor's intent
was not demonstrated, as there was no evidence sufficient to persuade the fact finder that
her statements regarding the refusal of life-sustaining treatment were anything more
than an immediate reaction to an unpleasant experience associated with seeing or hear-
ing of another's prolonged death. Id. at 613-15.
97. 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987).
98. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 675.
99. Id. at 679.
100. Id.
101. Id. Ms. Rasmussen's treating physician placed "do not resuscitate" (DNR) and
"do not hospitalize" (DNH) orders on her chart after considering her diagnosis. Id. Dr.
Stephen Cox, medical director at Posada Del Sol and Ms. Rasmussen's former physician,
testified that Ms. Rasmussen was in a chronic vegetative state, from which she had no
chance of returning to a higher level of functioning. Id. Dr. William Masland, a court
appointed neurologist, testified that Ms. Rasmussen would never recover from her
profound vegetative state. Id.
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tional right to refuse medical treatment.10 2 The court then rea-
soned that such rights, although not absolute, outweigh any
opposing state interests. 10 3 Further, the court noted that an
incompetent individual's right to refuse medical treatment is not
lost merely because he or she failed to express his or her wishes
concerning medical treatment prior to becoming incompetent.' 4
Consistent with the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court
in the Foody case, the Rasmussen court found that a "best inter-
ests" standard should apply in this situation, allowing Ms. Ras-
mussen's surrogate decision maker to ascertain the course of
medical treatment that would be in her best interests. 10 5 The
decision maker could determine the treatment by considering
objective criteria such as relief from suffering, preservation or
restoration of functioning and quality and extent of the life to be
sustained. 1°6 The court held that Ms. Rasmussen's best interests
would be served by the placement of the DNR and DNH orders
on her medical chart.
10 7
In the case of In Conservator of Drabick, 10 8 the California
Supreme Court considered whether state statutory law may be
used to effectuate the right of an incompetent individual to ter-
102. Id. at 681-82. The court first noted the common law's recognition of the right to
be free from bodily invasion, and asserted that the doctrine of informed consent permits
individuals to refuse medical treatment. Id at 682-83. The court also found that individ-
uals have a state constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, referencing Article 2,
section 8 of the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 682. Article 2, section 8 of the Arizona Con-
stitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law." Aiz. CONST. ART. 2, § 8. The court stated that indi-
viduals have a fimdamental constitutional right to refuse medical treatment as the
Supreme Court of the United States has recognized such a right of personal privacy to
emanate from a penumbra of specific guarantees of amendments to the United States
Constitution. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 681.
103. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683-85. Although the state's interest in preserving life
is strong, according to the court, such interest yields to an individual's interest in refusing
treatment where the treatment at issue serves only to prolong a life inflicted with an
incurable infirmity. Id. at 683.
104. Id. at 686. The court asserted that the value of human dignity extends to both
competent and incompetent individuals, and thus the standards of logic, morality and
medicine dictate that both be treated equally. Id.
105. Id. at 689.
106. Id. According to the court, the substituted judgment standard provides little or
no guidance to the surrogate decision-maker when no reliable evidence of the incompe-
tent individual's intent regarding termination of medical treatment exists. Id. at 688.
Rather, the substituted judgment standard best aids a guardian when the patient mani-
fested an intent regarding life-sustaining treatment while competent. Id.
107. Id. Ms. Rasmussen's best interests would be served in this manner because
any medical treatment provided to her in the absence of the "do not resuscitate" and "do
not hospitalize" notations would only prolong her death rather than improve her life. Id.
108. 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988).
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minate his or her life-sustaining treatment.' In Drabick, Wil-
liam Drabick was rendered unconscious when he sustained a
severe head injury in an automobile accident on February 5,
1983.110 Although Mr. Drabick lapsed into a persistent vegeta-
tive state and a nasogastric feeding tube was inserted to sustain
his life, California law considered Mr. Drabick to be alive
because he was able to breath without the assistance of a
respirator. '1
In considering whether Mr. Drabick's conservator'1 2 could
authorize the removal and withholding of his life-sustaining
treatment, the court in Drabick recognized that an individual
has the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment under
both common law and the constitutional right to privacy." 3 The
court then noted that in this case, a state probate statute permit-
ted a patient's conservator to authorize the removal of the
patient's life-sustaining treatment." 4 As a result, the court con-
cluded that a conservatee's desire to have a patient's medical
treatment withdrawn need not be proven by clear and convincing
evidence." 5 Moreover, the court found judicial approval not to be
required with respect to a conservator's decision to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from an incompetent individual absent dis-
agreement among interested parties." 6 Therefore, in this case,
Mr. Drabick's conservator was permitted to authorize the with-
109. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 841. In particular, the court considered whether
section 2355 of the Probate Code permits the removal of a nasogastric tube from a forty-
four year old man who was in a persistent vegetative state as a result of an automobile
accident. Id. at 840. Section 2355 of the Probate Code provides that where a conservatee
lacks the ability to give informed consent to medical treatment, a conservator's consent is
sufficient to require the conservatee to receive medical treatment. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 2355, SUBD.(A) (WEST 1991).
110. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53.
111. Id.
112. A "conservator" is a guardian appointed by the court to manage the affairs of an
incompetent individual. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 306 (6th ed. 1990).
113. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53.
114. Id. at 849. The court concluded that the legislature intended section 2355 of
the Probate Code to give conservators the power to withhold consent to medical treatment
on behalf of incompetent individuals. Id.
115. Id. at 857.
116. Id. at 850-51. The court indicated that section 2355 of the Probate Code does
not require judicial approval of medical treatment decisions. Id. Additionally, the court
noted that the highest courts of other states do not require judicial approval of decisions
to withdraw medical treatment from an individual in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at
851. See, e.g., Matter of Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987)(holding judicial review of deci-
sion to remove medical treatment from comatose individual unnecessary or inappropriate
absent dispute among family members, guardians or physicians as to whether treatment
should be discontinued).
1997 In Re Fiori 933
Duquesne Law Review
holding of Mr. Drabick's life-sustaining treatment and permit
him to die a natural death.
117
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,"' the United
States Supreme Court considered whether an incompetent indi-
vidual has a right to withdraw his or her life-sustaining medical
treatment under the United States Constitution." 9 In Cruzan,
Nancy Cruzan had suffered severe injuries after she lost control
of her car. 20 Ms. Cruzan later lapsed into a coma, and surgeons
implanted a gastrostomy tube into her stomach.','
In resolving the issue, the Supreme Court first assumed that
the Constitution protects the right of a competent patient to
reject life-saving nutrition and hydration. 1 22 With respect to an
incompetent patient, however, the Court found that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to
require the patient's wishes concerning the refusal or removal of
life-sustaining medical treatment to be proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence.123 The Supreme Court additionally found that
a state may choose to specifically defer to the wishes of the
patient and thus not accept the substituted judgment of close
family members. 124 In conclusion, therefore, the Court found
that the Missosuri Supreme Court did not err by requiring Ms.
Cruzan's wishes as to living in a vegetative state to be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. 25
The majority opinion in Cruzan was followed by concurring
decisions by Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia and a dissent by
117. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
118. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
119. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
120. Id. at 266. Paramedics restored Ms. Cruzan's breathing and cardiac function
at the accident site and then transported her to a hospital. Id.
121. Id. Subsequent rehabilitation proved unsuccessful, however, and Ms. Cruzan
is still in a permanent vegetative state in a Missouri hospital. Id.
122. Id. at 279. The court asserted that the constitutionally protected "liberty"
interest of a competent individual to reject unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from prior decisions. Id. at 278.
123. Id. at 280. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in
pertinent part: "no state shall make or enforce any law which ... shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
The Court asserted that the Due Process Clause allows a state to impose a heightened
evidentiary standard to protect its citizens against the potential abuses that may arise
during the decisionmaking process. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-82.
124. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285-87. The Court noted that there is no guarantee that
the views of close family members regarding a patient's wishes concerning the termina-
tion of life-sustaining treatment necessarily reflect the views of the patient. Id. at 286.
125. Id. at 285. The Court left open the decision of whether a state is required to
accept the decision of a surrogate decisionmaker if the incompetent patient had expressed
a desire, while competent, as to the decision regarding termination of life-sustaining
treatment. Id. at 287 n.12.
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Justice Brennan. 126 Justice O'Connor stated in her concurrence
that in order to protect an incompetent individual's liberty inter-
est in refusing medical treatment, states may be constitutionally
required to accept the decision of a surrogate regarding the indi-
vidual's intent to terminate life-sustaining treatment.'27 Justice
O'Connor noted that considering only the patient's previously
expressed instructions as to his or her intent concerning the
refusal of life-sustaining treatment may frequently fail to effectu-
ate the patient's wishes. 12
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the
majority's decision that a state may require clear and convincing
evidence of an incompetent patient's intent as to the removal of
his or her life-sustaining medical treatment. 129 Justice Scalia
disagreed, however, with the majority's finding that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the source of the
state's power to require clear and convincing evidence of such
intent.130 Justice Scalia noted that a substantive due process
claim may not be entertained unless the state has deprived the
claimant of a right that has historically and traditionally been
protected from state interference.' 3' Finding an individual's
decision to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment commensu-
rate with suicide, Justice Scalia reasoned that due process does
not govern a state's decision concerning whether to permit an
individual to refuse such treatment because the right to commit
suicide is not rooted in our tradition and is thus not deemed "fun-
damental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 132
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan found that incompe-
tent individuals have a fundamental right to refuse artificial
nutrition and hydration. 133 Justice Brennan also asserted that
an incompetent individual's interest in terminating life-sus-
taining medical treatment is not outweighed by the state's inter-
est in preserving life, since no right has been afforded greater
126. Id. at 287-357.
127. Id. at 289.
128. Id. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293. (Scalia, J., concurring).
130. Id. 497 U.S. at 293-95. (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 293-94.
132. Id. at 293-95. Justice Scalia asserted that there is no distinction between
actively taking one's life and inactively allowing oneself to starve to death, as the cause of
death in each case is the individual's conscious decision to end his or her life. Id. at 296-
97.
133. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that fundamental
liberties are those liberties "deeply rooted in [our] nation's history and tradition." Id. at
304-05 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986)(holding that the United States
Constitution does not encompass fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy as
such conduct is not deeply rooted in nation's history and tradition)).
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protection at common law than the right to be free from bodily
invasion.
134
In the twenty years since the New Jersey Supreme Court
reached its decision in the Quinlan case, the United States
Supreme Court and appellate courts in approximately twenty
states have considered the right of patients in a vegetative state
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment.
1 35
As the law has continued to develop in this area, so, too, has a
general consensus regarding the rights at issue. Of the twenty-
one states that have decided whether an incompetent patient has
the right to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, fourteen states have held that either a family member,
guardian or conservator may exercise the patient's right to with-
draw such treatment. 3 6 The same fourteen states have also held
that court approval of the decision is generally not required.
137
Consistent with the trend followed in other jurisdictions, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by relying on common law, cor-
rectly held in Fiori that all individuals have a right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment. 3 According to common law, no
right is afforded greater protection than the right to be free from
bodily invasion. 39 From this right is derived the doctrine of
informed consent, which provides that medical treatment may
not be given to a patient in a non-emergency situation without
the patient's informed consent.140 As the right to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment is a logical corollary to the right to
informed consent, the right to refuse such treatment is also enti-
tled to common law protection. '4'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also properly recognized
that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment survives incom-
petency."4  The Pennsylvania Legislature, in enacting the
Advance Directive for Health Care Act, has recognized the right
of patients in a persistent vegetative state to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.143 The Act notes that competent
adults have the right to control decisions relating to their own
134. Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 305-06, 313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Brennan, the right to refuse medical treatment is deeply rooted in our nation's
traditions as it is entrenched in both common law and tort law. Id. at 305-06.
135. Brief of Appellee at 16, Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 000737).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Fiori, 673 A.2d at 909.
139. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
140. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
141. Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1992).
142. Fori, 673 A.2d at 110.
143. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5401 (West 1975 & Supp. 1996).
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medical care, and by executing advanced directives, may refuse
life-sustaining treatment in the event of permanent
unconsciousness.'"
It is unfortunate, however, that in deciding Fiori, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court neglected to recognize how state and
federal constitutional rights to privacy, the federal due process
"liberty" interest and the fundamental nature of the right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment affect the issue presented in
that case. As noted previously in this case note, there is much
case law analyzing each of these areas.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding that court involve-
ment in a decision whether to terminate a person's life-sus-
taining medical treatment should be limited to resolving
disputes between interested parties on the matter is commenda-
ble. 4 ' Deciding whether to terminate an individual's life-sus-
taining treatment is both difficult and painful to all those
involved. Most patients affected by termination of such treat-
ment likely want the termination decision to be made by their
families and physicians rather than by strangers or government.
Clearly, the judiciary is no better able to make this decision than
the patient's family and physicians,1 6 and requiring family
members to undergo a court proceeding only places an added
burden on everyone during this difficult time.147 Additionally,
the patient is adequately protected from potential abuses when
the decision to terminate is made by a surrogate after approval
by two physicians.
14
Although advances in medical technology have changed both
the time and manner of death in recent years, such that medical
science now allows a patient's life to be prolonged past the point
of consciousness, many patients still wish to die a natural, digni-
fied death.149 Many patients do not want their physiological
functions to continue while they are unaware of their own exist-
ence and surroundings. Additionally, many patients do not want
to be kept alive by life-sustaining treatments that require them
to be moved from the familiar home environment to a less per-
144. See id. § 5402 (a). The Act defines "permanently unconscious" to include indi-
viduals in a persistent vegetative state. Id. § 5403.
145. See Fiori, 673 A.2d at 913.
146. See Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1356-57; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. Fiori, 652 A.2d at 1356.
148. Id. at 1356-57.
149. Brief of Appellee at 12, Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996) (No. 000737)(citing AMA
Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life, reprinted in 267
JAMA 2229 (1992)). The vast majority of all deaths occurring sixty years ago occurred in




sonal atmosphere of the hospital and nursing home in order to
die. 1
50
The United States Constitution indeed guarantees our most
sacred and cherished right - the right to "life." Those patients
who wish to cling to every last heartbeat that medical science is
capable of providing, therefore, are adequately protected. Impor-
tantly, however, in order to safeguard the rights of all individu-
als, the judiciary needs to be mindful of both the right to live, and
the right to die.
Michael P. Bodosky
150. Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative
State (Pts. 1 & 2), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1501 (1994).
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